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The Strategic Uses of Gender in Household Negotiations: 
Women Workers on Mexico’s Northern Border 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The study illustrates the potential of the ‘doing gender’ perspective to explain why employment 
helps women win some negotiations at home but not others.  Eighteen in-depth interviews with 
women maquiladora workers in Mexico suggest that employment may help women gain new 
rights and extend the limits of respect accorded them by male companions and parents. Women 
were more successful when they used negotiating strategies that conformed to their gender 
identity, such as making offers, than when they used negotiating strategies that challenged 
traditional gender norms, such as withdrawing services or making threats.   
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The Strategic Uses of Gender in Household Negotiations: 
Women Workers on Mexico’s Northern Border  
In the 1970s, employment opportunities for women increased as the burgeoning export 
processing industries hired women worldwide, raising the question: Would more employment 
opportunities for women improve their well-being? Scholars agreed it was important to focus on 
whether a shift in women’s access to material resources increases women’s household power 
(Benería and Roldán, 1987; Blumberg, 1995; Dwyer and Bruce, 1988; Salaff, 1981; Stichter and 
Parpart, 1990; Tinker, 1990; Ward, 1990). Like researchers of household power in industrial 
societies (McDonald, 1980; Szinovacz, 1987), they expected an increase in women’s labour 
force participation to make women less economically dependent on men, and therefore more 
likely to gain household power.  
Research indicated otherwise. In a study of women in the Mexican export processing 
industry, Fernandez-Kelly (1983) concluded that ‘employment of women in multinational 
assembly plants does not inevitably lead to gains in autonomy on the part of women’ (pp. 136-
137). Additionally, ‘women’s control of their earnings is only minimally translated into a 
bargaining mechanism pertinent to wives’ share of unpaid domestic work’ (p. 135).  Benería and 
Roldán (1987) found that employment in Mexico City’s subcontracting industry did not increase 
women’s control over household income, nor did it reduce their burden of household labour. It 
did, however, secure women greater respect from their husbands. Research shows that the effects 
of employment in export processing industries on women’s relative power at home appear 
contradictory and complex (Kabeer, 2000; Ong, 1987; Wolf, 1992). What can explain this 
complex portrait of intra-household negotiations?  
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This study explores the potential of an innovative approach to gender, the ‘doing gender’ 
approach, to help explain the complexity of intra-household negotiations. In doing so it takes up 
Kabeer’s call to look ‘inside the black box’ of intra-household relations and reveal, ‘the 
‘subjective’ insights provided by those experiencing the posited changes’ (1997, p. 262).  It also 
responds to Fernandez-Kelly’s admonition that ‘yet more effort is needed by way of theorizing 
gender as a relational process…’ (2000). This study revisits the research site of Fernandez-
Kelly’s seminal study (Mexico’s northern border) and uses interviews with women maquiladora 
workers to explore whether women are more successful at negotiating for their interests when 
they use strategies that affirm their traditional gender identities. 
 
The Potential of a ‘Doing Gender’ Household Bargaining Model 
Researchers struggle to explain why new female employment opportunities appear to 
have such uneven effects on women’s power at home. Scholars turn to gender norms to explain 
these contradictory effects, some viewing norms as ideologies that cloud perception of reality. 
Adapting the cooperative conflict bargaining model from economics (Manser and Brown, 1979; 
McElroy and Horney, 1981; Nash, 1953), Sen (1985; 1990) argues that gender norms can lead 
women as well as men to misperceive the value of women’s household contributions and 
therefore to legitimise unfair bargains. Some argue that gender norms may affect the 
interpretation of the type of work in which women engage (Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987; Benería 
and Roldán, 1987; Whitehead, 1985), finding that wages earned for home-based work tend to be 
perceived as less valuable than wages earned for outside work. Others view gender norms as 
operating through deeply internalised social roles. Whitehead (1981) argues that women do not 
negotiate for their own interests because they identify with a female role of the altruistic mother.  
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Each of these accounts can explain why women remain subordinate despite increased financial 
contributions to the household. Yet they have a hard time explaining why, even when women 
have new employment opportunities, they win some negotiations and not others. To explain 
these perplexing results we need to address the ‘major gaps’ identified by Agarwal (1997) ‘in 
spelling out the nature…of social norms in particular contexts and how they affect bargaining’ 
(p. 15). While social norms operate through household interactions, few consider how the 
gendered meanings of intra-household interactions can help explain variation in women’s 
household power outcomes.   
West and Zimmerman (1987) propose that gender norms are the aggregate effect of men 
and women actively affirming their gender identities through interactions. Adapting their 
approach, Brines (1994) posits that changing the balance of resources contributed by each 
household member may not result in redistributing household power because the household is 
not just a place where people exchange resources; it is also a place where people establish and 
affirm their gender identity. Finding that female breadwinners increased their housework, Brines 
reasons they may have done so in order to reassert their female identity. Similarly, as men 
became increasingly dependent on women, men performed less housework. Brines interprets this 
as evidence that men affirm their gender identity by not doing women’s work (i.e. housework). 
Men and women in U.S. working class households, typified by sporadic male employment, 
worked harder to affirm their gender identity than did their counterparts in more affluent homes.  
Research in the developing world supports Brines’ conclusions. García and Oliveira 
(1997) find that working class Mexican women, i.e. those most likely to be equal or primary 
financial contributors to their households, were more likely than middle class women to view 
motherhood as a ‘guiding principle’ (p. 378). Similarly, although Kabeer (1997; 2000) does not 
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draw from the ‘doing gender’ perspective, she underscores its potential for explaining why 
employment has, as she puts it, such ‘elusive’ effects on women’s power at home. Employed 
women in Bangladesh ‘went to considerable lengths to diffuse the possible challenge that their 
earning capacity might pose to gender hierarchies within the household’ (1997), implying that 
employed women made a conscious effort to counteract the challenge to female identity.   
In part because she does not empirically examine household interactions, Brines does not 
take her argument to its logical extension. Her work could be extended to predict that women ‘do 
gender’ even as they negotiate for their interests. Brines implies that the reason employment 
makes women assert their gender identity more actively is because employment makes women 
aware that they deserve more. Nevertheless, if women are also aware of the importance of 
maintaining their gender identity, as she posits, they may try to use negotiating strategies that 
conform to their gender identity even as they try to pursue their interests. Such a negotiating 
strategy might offset the challenge to their identity posed by the act of interest negotiation. This 
resembles Kandiyoti’s (1998) characterization of women’s negotiations in households as 
‘bargaining with patriarchy’, while also resonating with Kabeer’s (1997) description of intra-
household power relations as a ‘complex interweaving of self-interest and altruism, co-operation 
and conflict’ (p. 300). Like Kabeer, the ‘doing gender’ approach to household power emphasises 
women’s agency to affirm their gender identity and to negotiate for their interests.  
Research on Mexico provides evidence that men and women may affirm their gender 
identities even while they negotiate for change. ‘Cultural norms regarding motherhood change 
far more slowly in urban Mexico than child-rearing or fertility control practices’ (García and 
Oliveira, 1997, p. 382). The same study found that ‘many women from different social classes 
still consider motherhood as their main source of identity’, although ‘many women are ready to 
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accept child-care substitutes… [and are]…using contraceptives and limiting their family sizes’ 
(p. 382). These findings could be interpreted as evidence that Mexican women try to affirm 
broad aspects of their female identity, such as motherhood, while renegotiating the practical 
realities of those identities in their everyday lives. Gutmann (1996) finds that working class 
Mexican men, faced with chronic underemployment and concomitant financial dependence on 
wives, tolerate redefining the practical meanings of male identity to include traditionally female 
tasks such as childcare but sustain a commitment to traditional notions of masculinity.   
Stern’s research (1995) on gender and household power negotiations in colonial Mexico 
suggests that men and women are highly strategic. Even ‘before the historical awakening of 
feminist consciousness’ (Stern, 1995, p. 301), colonial era women used a range of bargaining 
strategies to pursue a host of interests with bargaining strategies used as social weapons. ‘The 
social weapons forged by women in such struggles were diverse and formidable…. The range of 
specific issues in play also proved impressive’ (p. 300). By treating negotiating strategies that 
conform to traditional gender norms as social weapons he reminds us that women may act in 
ways that appear at cross-purposes to their interests, but may in fact help them secure practical 
changes that they value.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
These studies point to a household bargaining model that integrates the ‘doing gender’ 
perspective. They imply that a woman’s relative dependency on her husband or parents may 
influence the gender identification of the negotiating strategy she chooses (arrow 1 in Figure 1).  
Decreasing financial dependence may raise women’s expectations and, as a result, their concern 
with maintaining their gender identity. This could lead women to choose negotiating strategies 
that affirm gender identity. García and Oliveira’s research (1997) suggests that gender 
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appropriate negotiating strategies may help women secure practical changes in their lives (Arrow 
2 in Figure 1). To evaluate this claim, however, research must determine the practical changes 
desired by women. The research presented below elaborates the range of women’s interests on 
Mexico’s northern border before it examines the relationship between the gender identification 
of their negotiating strategies and household power.   
 
Participating, Observing and Interviewing on Mexico’s Northern Border 
The analysis presented below is based on 37 days of field notes, recorded conversations 
and observations with 32 households, and 18 taped interviews with maquiladora workers. Data 
was collected during the summer of 1995 in Agua Prieta, Sonora, a small border town. Similar to 
other border towns in its experience of urbanization and industrialization after Mexico’s Border 
Industrialization Program began in 1965, approximately 20,000 of its 100,000 inhabitants work 
in maquiladoras (mostly foreign-owned export assembling factories). Having spent two years 
promoting workers’ legal rights in Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila, I introduced myself to households 
as both a legal rights educator and as a researcher interested in maquiladora workers. Households 
from three different working class neighbourhoods were sampled, and in each one a cluster of 
homes in a four-block radius were sampled (one rejection). Between one and nine contacts with 
households, resulted in visits ranging in length from one hour to several days (average 90 
minutes).  Interviews were taped – eleven with married women and seven with single women 
(two single mothers living on their own, three single mothers and two childless daughters living 
with relatives). I asked women about changes they desired (i.e. interests), the way they 
negotiated for interests (i.e. negotiating strategies) and whether they won their negotiations (i.e. 
power outcomes).  
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In the analysis, I divided each woman’s life history into stints demarcated by changes in 
employment status, giving a sample of forty-five stints of varying lengths. Interests, bargaining 
strategies and power outcomes for each stint of each woman’s life were coded. Each stint was 
also coded according to whether they were daughters living at home or wives. Focused 
exclusively on intra-household negotiations between women and other adults, the analysis did 
not include stints when women were single and living alone.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 summarises the distribution of these forty-five stints for eighteen women.  At the  
time of the interviews, fourteen women were employed and two unemployed. (Two single 
women were working and their stints not included in the analysis.) Before the interview, women 
had collectively experienced twenty stints of employment and nine unemployment stints. Most 
employment stints were experienced as daughters living at home (fourteen of twenty). As all 
“daughters” interviewed were employed, only married women recounted previous stints of 
unemployment.  Among them, they had had nine prior stints of unemployment. 
 
Women’s Interests on Mexico’s Northern Border 
I define women’s interests as a desire for change that they themselves express. By 
inductively defining women’s interests, I elaborate what Maxine Molyneux (1985) terms their 
practical gender interests: interests that might not ‘entail a strategic goal such as women’s 
emancipation’ (p. 233). Women in this study identified some interests, such as the desire to win 
the right to employment, which challenged traditional female identity, while others had more 
ambiguous gender meanings.  
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Data was coded not only for instances when women expressed an interest in increasing 
their control over the flow of resources in the household or in reducing their burden of 
housework, but also for instances when women expressed an interest in renegotiating the limits 
of respect in their relationships. Prior research indicated the importance Mexican women placed 
on redefining the ‘limits of respect’. Disrespect resulting from alcohol abuse was ‘the most 
commonly reported source of misery’ in a study of rural Mexican women (Townsend, 1995, p. 
109). Being treated like servants or children by mother-in-laws drove women to pursue the legal 
right to leave their husbands, according to supreme court rulings on divorce cases in early post-
revolutionary Mexico (Varley, 2000, pp. 250-251).  Employment in Mexico City’s 
subcontracting industry in the 1980s helped some women (those in households dependent on 
woman’s earnings) redefine ‘the limits of respect’ and demand ‘new rights’ (Benería and Roldán, 
1987, p. 161).  According to this study, working-class Mexican women expected not to be 
physically or verbally abused, to have some control over their fertility and to be recognised for 
their household contribution (p. 138). Employment did not, however, help these women 
significantly reduce their housework, nor did it increase their control over the flow of household 
resources.   Similarly, recently employed rural Javanese women did not acquire more control 
over the flow of resources in the household but did acquire some autonomy from parents and 
husbands in their marriage, sexuality and fertility choices (Wolf, 1992, p. 229).  Women 
employed in Bangladesh’s new industrial centres did not increase control over resources at home 
but earning a wage increased life choices, leading some women to leave husbands and others to 
live in households with no male guardian (Kabeer, 1997; Kabeer, 2000).1  
Employment itself may be an important interest for which women negotiate (Benería and 
Roldán, 1987; Blumberg, 1988; Blumberg, 1995; Dwyer and Bruce, 1988; England and Farkas, 
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1986; Folbre and Hartmann, 1988; Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1983; Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1994; 
Pyke, 1994). Many Bangladeshi women confronted resistance from husbands and fathers when 
they expressed their interest to seek employment (Kabeer, 2000). Kabeer argues that the 
reluctance of many recently employed women to negotiate for their interests may be partly due 
to the feeling that they already gained a right to work (p. 189).  Thus, I also examine whether 
women viewed employment as their right.  To distinguish from instances of women being 
allocated by households to work (Fernández-Kelly, 1983; Kabeer, 1998; Salaff, 1981; Schmink, 
1986; Tilly and Scott, 1978), only instances when women faced opposition to their desire to take 
employment were coded as women viewing employment as a right. 
A significant portion of women interviewed faced opposition to their desire to work 
(Table 2). In 31 percent of all stints (fourteen out of 45 stints) women wanted to work but were 
not supported by husbands or parents. For example, Maria was upset when her husband would 
not let her work, ‘I was sad because I didn’t like being at home.’ She had worked before her 
marriage, which lasted a few months. Reyna, married at sixteen, described her husband’s 
unwillingness to let her work.  ‘He didn’t want me to work.  I wanted to but he wouldn’t let me.  
I got bored in the house…’.  Reyna explained that she wanted to work to have access to her own 
money. Nonetheless, Reyna complied with her husband’s wishes and stopped work, enduring three 
years in an unhappy marriage.  
Married women such as Maria and Reyna were more likely to identify employment as an 
interest.  They did so in 42 percent of their employment stints. By contrast, daughters identified 
an interest to be employed in only fifteen percent of their stints. Many married women faced 
opposition to their desire to earn wages.   
[Table 2 about here] 
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Did women go to work in the maquiladoras because they negotiated with their families 
for the right to work? According to Table 3, twenty-nine percent of stints represented successful 
bargains by women to go to work. In the remaining stints, families gave daughters and wives 
their blessing to earn wages.  However, married women confronted more opposition than 
daughters: they had to negotiate to work for nearly half, or forty-five percent of their stints.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 I identified sixteen interests expressed by women during stints of employment. Employed 
women expressed an interest in several types of new rights, which challenged prevailing gender 
norms.  Employed daughters, in particular, wanted new rights or freedoms. Four daughters 
sought to challenge existing gender identities that restricted their freedom of movement or 
freedom of association.  For example, Carla pleaded with her mother to be allowed to attend the 
city fair, despite her mother’s reluctance. Maria, a twenty-year-old single mother living with her 
parents, identified her interest in volunteering for the Red Cross. Recently separated, Maria 
supported herself and her baby by working in a maquiladora, but her parents forbade her from 
going out. Out of earshot of her parents, she explained, ‘They [her parents] are afraid that I will 
meet someone else like that [like her former husband] and the same thing will happen to me.  I feel 
very closed in.’ By expressing her sense of claustrophobia, Maria expressed her interest to have 
greater freedom of movement. 
Employed wives valued their freedom of movement, particularly after growing 
accustomed to these rights as employed daughters. Two employed wives expressed discomfort 
when their husbands constrained their rights. Jorgina, a married woman in her mid 30s who had 
worked since she was 16, said, ‘being married just isn't like being single when you can go and come 
as you please, without asking permission.’ Estella was acutely aware that marrying her husband 
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had cost her the accustomed freedom to go grocery shopping. Her husband was dissatisfied, ‘he 
went the very first week and bought groceries and I gave him money and he bought the 
necessities…. He demanded it [the money].  I still never go out. He doesn't like it when I go 
out….I think he doesn't trust me and that he should trust me because he knows how I am.’  
By expressing her interest to have freedom, Estella may also be expressing an interest to 
have control over household resources. Several women expressed their interest in having control 
over the flow of household resource, which did not always challenge gender norms. For 
example, when two employed daughters expressed a desire to reduce contributions they 
challenged the generational expectation that children financially contribute to the household, 
while also challenging the gender norm that daughters contribute more earnings than boys.  
Having supported her family from the age of ten, Carla, now 17, told her mother ‘It doesn’t seem 
fair that I should automatically have the responsibility to pay for the gas. Why shouldn’t my 
sister pay for the gas?’. Her fifteen year old sister, Cecilia, had recently begun earning money 
and sharing the financial burden. Other women reinforced gender norms as they sought to 
increase the household pool of resources. Alicia, a 30 year-old woman who had worked all her 
life, wanted her husband to increase his household financial contribution, and her interest could be 
interpreted as a desire to reassert traditional gender identities. Alicia related her dismay with her 
former husband of twelve years. ‘He was very bad. All he wanted was his beer. It didn't matter how 
high prices were.  We didn't have electricity, or water or a gas stove and sometimes I would ask him 
to get firewood and he had a truck, but he wouldn't even get that for me. Sometimes [the children] 
were hungry but he didn't care.’    
Alicia’s frustration with her husband also represented an interest to command more respect. 
When women sought to renegotiate the limits of respect accorded them by husbands, they sought 
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changes with ambiguous gender identifications. Women, particularly employed wives, identified 
a wide range of spousal and parental behaviors that they felt denigrated them. Karina, an 
employed married woman with two small children, found living with her in-laws onerous. She 
said, ‘I told [her husband] I was ready to move out to our own plot of land and live in our own 
house. I think he was afraid to leave the house. He is very spoiled by his mother.’  Several women 
wanted their husbands to show respect by reducing alcohol consumption or infidelities. Now in 
her late forties, Liana had worked before, during and after her marriage in which her husband drank 
heavily and had multiple affairs. Liana lamented, ‘He was very shameless.  He had other women.  I 
wanted him to stop drinking. He became less responsible as I took over [the household 
responsibilities].’  
These women expressed desires for new rights, including the right to be employed. They 
also wanted their husbands to treat them with respect and some wanted control over household 
resources. None of these women, however, expressed a desire to reduce their burden of housework.  
While a desire for rights may be easy to categorise as challenging gender identities, the interests in 
renegotiating the limits of respect and greater control over household resources were difficult to 
classify.   
 
Gendered Negotiating Strategies 
 To examine whether the gender identity of negotiating strategies affected women’s power 
outcomes, the bargaining strategies were coded according to whether they reinforced or 
challenged traditional working class gender identities in Mexico. Mexican women define 
motherhood broadly, often reinterpreting their wages as contributing to their identity as mothers 
because wages give them an opportunity to contribute financially to their children. Indeed, 
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women tend to redirect most of their earnings to overall household expenditures and children in 
particular (Benería and Roldán, 1987; Chant, 1997). Mexican motherhood identity in Mexico 
may be more associated with the act of offering help to the household than with the actual day-
to-day care of children. Negotiating strategies were coded according to whether women offered 
something to the household through which they could maintain their primary gender identity. For 
daughters, an offer might affirm their identity as female and as children serving parents. In 
contrast, instances when women tried to negotiate by withdrawing services or making threats 
were coded as negotiating strategies that challenged gender identities. I identified and coded 26 
bargains (when women negotiated for their interests) in all: thirteen bargaining strategies used by 
eleven women to seek employment and eleven bargains pursued by employed women. 2   
  
Offers 
 Table 4 summarises the range of bargaining strategies women used to negotiate for the 
right to earn wages. Daughters and wives tended to use offers, negotiating strategies that 
affirmed their gender identity, in order to win the right to work. This correlation suggests that 
women tried to offset a gender-challenging interest by using a gender-affirming negotiating 
strategy. Several women offered to do more household work as a bargaining strategy. One of five 
children, Karina recalled her first decision to seek employment when she was sixteen. Her parents 
wanted her to stop working to spend more time on housework. ‘They wanted me to quit to help out 
more in the house, but I didn’t want to because I liked the money.’ She was able to convince them 
that she could do both, and remained employed for over a year in the maquiladora until leaving to 
the USA as a domestic servant.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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 Lydia, a 28-year-old married woman, recounted how she bargained with her husband for the 
right to work. Having worked on and off in the maquiladoras for 7 years, she promised her husband 
food on the table if he let her work.  Another married woman in her early 30s, Miriam, told me ‘It 
[working] doesn’t make a difference to him [her husband], so long as the house is clean and his 
food is ready when he comes home.’  She explained why she liked work: ‘Sometimes I just get 
tired of being at home, so I go to work for a while.’ These women offered housework as a 
bargaining strategy to win the right to work. However, offering housework was not the only offer 
used to negotiate for wage earning rights. Some teenage daughters offered to take care of 
themselves if their parents let them work. Coming from a village to the south, Reyna and her 
family visited the border for several months when she was fifteen. She wanted to work in a 
maquiladora at the time: ‘I wanted to buy my own necessities, to buy my own clothes.’ When her 
parents returned to their hometown, she and her sister wanted to work in the maquiladoras 
despite her father’s opposition. ‘[My father] scolded me a lot, and Chela [her sister] didn't pay 
attention. He was scared that we would get married, but in any case we stayed here…. for two 
months more than they did.’ Reyna had not given any money to her family, but supported 
herself. Karina, now a veteran maquiladora worker at 26, explained that her parents allowed her to 
work as a domestic in the USA at age 17, because it was a way to ‘take care of myself’. Both 
Reyna and Karina affirmed their gender identity through a negotiating strategy that offered help 
to the family – in this case relief from financial burden.  
 Others used an offer made possible by employment: an offer of a financial contribution to 
the household.  At age 14, Maria negotiated with her parents to work at a maquiladora, as she 
‘wanted my own things, that’s why I wanted to work.’ However, ‘[the] family didn't like it 
because my father says that women should be at home keeping house and that men should be 
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working.’ Maria negotiated for an interest that challenged her father’s notions of appropriate 
female identity, not just her child identity, by offering to give them half of her earnings after 
which they permitted her to work.  
 Wives also used offers of financial contributions to convince spouses that they should work.  
Some used specific large household endeavours, such as house building, to justify returning to 
work. Lea offered to help finish the house if her husband would allow her to work. Patricia 
acknowledged that ‘He didn’t want me to work, but it helped us out for me to work.’  Her husband 
viewed her employment as a challenge to his idea of what a wife should be, and only reluctantly 
permitted her work. Estella stopped working for two years when she married and had children, but 
returned once her youngest was seven months old, having negotiated with her husband. ‘I wanted 
to work to help out, because what he makes goes for food and the water and electricity bills. I 
want to have something more, more than just a one room shack...’.  Offering a financial 
contribution towards house-building convinced him that she should be permitted to work. Mona 
persuaded her husband that she should work as it would enable them to move out of his parent’s 
house.   
 Some wives used an economic crisis to justify their interest in working for wages. They 
offered financial contributions during an economic crisis in exchange for the right to work. Twenty-
seven years old and married for nine years, Jorgina convinced her husband to let her continue 
working after they married. ‘He doesn’t want me to work, but because of the crisis [the 1995 peso 
devaluation], I felt I needed to…to buy the building materials for the house.’  At fifteen, she had 
worked for several years to support her family after her mother died. Now, she justified 
employment in terms of helping her young family survive the economic crisis, even though her 
husband viewed her employment as inappropriate female behaviour.  With the peso devaluation in 
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December 1994, Neomi and her live-in partner could not make ends meet, and she wanted to 
return to work, but he forbade it. In her bargaining strategy, ‘I try to tell him that between the 
two of us we can make our lives a little bit better.... Sometimes there isn’t food and I’ve got 
children and I’m getting older.  With both of us working we can do something, I tell him.  But 
he’s closed. No, I’ll do it, he tells me.  I don’t want you to work.... He always says “wait, I’ll do 
it.”’ Neomi’s pleadings were in vain: her partner would not change his mind. Some husbands 
remained unwilling to allow their wives to work, viewing employment as a direct challenge to her 
female identity and his male identity.   
Employed women also offered their wages in negotiations to seek other interests. Estella 
negotiated for her right to greater freedom of movement by offering a household financial 
contribution. She renegotiated for freedom to do grocery shopping:  ‘.... we aren’t the same now 
[after she restarted work]. We always go shopping together now. He is different with me…I feel 
better. When I wasn’t working I never asked him for money or anything.’ Estella used waged 
work as a bargaining strategy to gain desired freedoms. Carla and Cecilia negotiated with their 
mother to go to the city fair, pointing out their financial household contribution. These women 
used earnings to bargain for their interests by making financial offers to the household.  Making 
an offer was, however, not the only bargaining strategy used. Some turned to strategies that more 
directly challenged traditional gender identities. 
  
Withholding and Making Threats 
 Women sometimes found that making an offer was insufficient to secure their interests, and 
they turned to withholding services and making threats, a negotiating strategy that more directly 
challenged a gender identity.  Lacking direct access to money, one might expect unemployed 
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women to resort to withdrawing services or threatening to do so. This strategy is exemplified by 
Maria’s efforts to convince her husband to curtail his infidelity. Having stopped work after she 
married at his request, Maria negotiated with her husband by withholding her cooking. She said, 
‘I noticed right away that he was seeing someone, because he started to dress up to go out, he 
came home about a half an hour late everyday and said that he was working over time. He had 
always given all of the money to me, but I found his receipts for his paychecks and I learned that 
he hadn't been working over time and I confronted him with it. I said that he already had another 
woman. I wouldn't make him dinner that night, or lunch the next day.’ In this instance, Maria 
challenged her female identity when she tried to negotiate more respect from her husband. 
However, even employed women – those that had the additional advantage of financial resources to 
offer to the household - turned to withholding services or making threats in order to secure their 
interests.  
 Several employed daughters negotiated for greater control over the flow of resources in 
the household. Cecilia, 15 years old, negotiated a reduction in her financial contribution to the 
household by not disclosing her earnings – a strategy employed by men in Benería and Roldán’s 
study. Hiding her pay stubs, she also tried to evade paying for household cooking gas by buying 
a pair of shoes. She withheld financial contributions as a way to negotiate a reduction in her 
regular financial contribution, while additionally threatening that she would leave the house. She 
knew that this would be a serious threat as her financial contribution kept the household afloat.  
 Additionally, several employed wives negotiated to alter the limits of respect by making 
threats. Mona’s husband moved to the border, several hours away from her home state, and for 
two years they had a long-distance relationship.  She tried to negotiate with her husband to come 
back. Mona said, ‘I had a good job working in a nursery in [her home state].’ Mona negotiated 
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with her husband by threatening not to move to the border. ‘I didn’t really want to come…But he 
had a job here and so I came here.’  Humiliated by living with her in-laws, Karina tried to convince 
her husband to move out of their house by threatening to leave him. Now in her mid-twenties, she 
recounted her negotiations with her husband.  ‘I told him that I was ready to move back with my 
mother if he didn't want to move.’ With threats of moving out, Karina led her husband to buy their 
own property. Alicia negotiated with her husband to try to increase his household contribution and 
reduce his drinking by threatening to force him to leave the house. Zilla, too, threatened to throw 
her husband out of the house if he did not stop drinking. When he refused, she forced him to 
leave. Liana decided she would no longer accept her husband’s philandering; ‘I separated from 
him.  I decided to leave [their home and him].’ During their seven years apart, she worked and 
supported her children on her own.   
 Although employment opportunities give women the option of bargaining for the right to 
be employed by making an offer of a financial household contributions, many women found it 
necessary to turn to a more confrontational bargaining strategy. As Table 4 indicates, some 
women resorted to threats in their negotiations to seek employment. Despite abject poverty, male 
partners sometimes would not consent to their wives’ work.  Both women who used threats faced 
considerable economic hardship. Neomi gave her partner an ultimatum, ‘I gave him a month to 
prove to me…to put up one wall [of an additional bedroom to their house] but if not…I will have 
to go to work…and go on alone….’  She realised that to carry out the threat, she had to 
contemplate leaving her partner.  Her tearful account of this dilemma indicated her high level of 
anxiety over using this bargaining strategy.  
 Carmen threatened to move to the border with the children by herself, if her husband 
would not go with her.  When Carmen was twenty-three, her husband’s father died and left the 
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family farm to her brother-in-law rather than her husband. As a result, ‘we were very poor there. 
Sometimes we didn’t even have food to eat.  I remember that I didn’t have any shoes. In fact my 
son, the older one, cried because he couldn’t go to his kindergarten graduation because we didn’t 
have enough money to buy him the uniform…I had no money.’  At this point, she tried to 
convince her husband to go to the border. ‘He didn’t want to move, but I said that I would leave 
and go by myself, if he didn’t want to, because I needed money for the children.’ Her threat 
worked, and he sold a cow to make money for the move, although ‘he didn’t want me to work 
early on…but now he’s used to it and we make more money.’ After using a threat to win the 
right to move the family where she could work, she is able to justify employment on the basis of 
family financial contributions. However, the question remains - did women’s negotiating 
strategies make a difference in how likely they were to achieve their interests? The following 
section addresses this question.  
 
How did women win their interests?  
 Table 5 summarises how likely women were to win their bargains according to the type 
of strategy they used.  Women won all of the interests for which they negotiated by making an 
offer. By contrast, they only won fifty percent of bargains when using a threat. In other words, 
when women negotiated by affirming their gender identity they were more successful at securing 
their interests.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Women tended to win negotiations when they used an offer, even when the interest for 
which they negotiated challenged traditional gender identities. They were successful in all 
instances when they negotiated by making an offer for the right of employment, an interest that 
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challenged gender identity.  The only instance when a woman did not win her negotiation to go 
to work was when she used a threat.  Neomi was the only one to use a threat to win the right to 
work, and by late summer 1994, she admitted to me that she had given up trying to convince her 
partner to let her work. Apart from the right to employment, employed women also secured most 
of their new rights when using offers in their negotiating strategy. Carla and Cecilia won the 
right to go to the city fair by making financial offers to the household. Estella, too, won 
additional freedom of movement by offering her earnings to the household income pool.  
Women were much less successful when they used threats, even when they negotiated for 
interests that could be interpreted as reinforcing traditional gender norms. For example, when 
Alicia threatened to throw out her husband, she negotiated for an interest that reinforced a male 
breadwinner identity. Her effort to force him into this role failed, and he left.  However, Alicia 
was not unhappy with this outcome, and proudly told me how she and her children were better 
off. ‘After all, I suffered with him and my children and we never lacked for food after he left the 
house and we ate whenever we wanted to. I mean we didn't have everything, but we never lacked 
for food.  You know, that's all I've ever worried about….’. 
When women negotiated by withdrawing services or making threats, they often 
negotiated to expand forms of respect that had ambiguous gender meanings. Such ambiguity may 
have contributed to varying outcomes in negotiations. For example, Zilla wanted her husband to 
stop drinking alcohol making his return to the household conditional upon attendance at 
Alcoholics Anonymous. Sobriety could be viewed as an interest in re-instating the male 
household role or a challenge to the right of men to drink with friends. Perhaps Zilla’s husband 
agreed and remained sober for six years because he interpreted her interest as a desire to reinstate 
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his role as head of the household. Similarly, the ambiguity of Karina’s interest to move out of her 
in-laws’ house may also have contributed to her success.  
Husbands may have interpreted efforts by wives to enforce fidelity as either an effort to 
support a traditional notion of the faithful husband or as a challenge to their male right to have 
affairs. Varied interpretations of this interest might help explain why Liana was successful in 
gaining respect from her husband, but Maria was not.  Liana successfully renegotiated the limits 
of respect in her relationship, including fidelity, by carrying out a threat to leave him. Liana’s 
husband eventually begged to come back, to which she agreed stipulating that she would control 
household finances and come and go as she pleased. She proudly describes her relationship after 
his return as ‘equal’.  She explains,  
‘Life before now?  Married life? Well, it was like:...you did what he said...and now I do 
what I want. I am not AS oppressed! I AM not oppressed!! [emphasis reflects her 
intonation].’   
Liana’s successes came after a long period of separation from her husband.  Perhaps her husband 
accepted these new terms of respect because they afforded him the opportunity to regain his 
masculine identity as husband and nominal head of household.   
Maria, however, was less successful. She failed to convince her husband to end his 
infidelity by withholding her cooking services.  In fact, she thought her threats led her husband to 
leave her.  ‘A few days later, he left. He said that he wouldn't take care of the child and that he 
was going to support this other woman instead…He has never come back since...’ Her husband 
may have interpreted her threat as an attempt to challenge his masculine identity. The fact that 
these interests could be interpreted in various ways may contribute to the divergent outcomes of 
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negotiations, which suggests that the gendered meaning of women’s interests may also affect 
women’s household power outcomes.   
 
Conclusion 
 This study explores the potential of a ‘doing gender’ model of household bargaining. By 
analyzing a sample of interests for which women negotiated, this study illustrates how women 
use the gender identification of negotiations strategically.  The fact that so many women in this 
study used offers (a negotiating strategy that conforms to women’s gender identity) illustrates 
that they used gender strategically to negotiate for interests that could challenge their gender 
identity.  They used offers to pursue the right to employment, greater control over household 
resources and greater respect from other household members. The evidence indicates that women 
may indeed attempt to maintain their gender identity, and therefore sustain gender norms, even 
as they pursue interests that challenge gender norms.   
 Although the association of success with certain negotiating strategies could be 
interpreted in several ways, the results highlight how the gendered meanings of household 
negotiations mediate the effects of employment opportunities on household power. The success 
women experienced when they made offers may mean that offers offset resistance from other 
household members because offers affirmed their female identity. The difficulty women 
encountered when they withdrew services and made threats may indicate that these strategies 
provoked resistance from other household members because they challenged women’s female 
identity. Thus, employment may enhance women’s bargaining position at home because it adds a 
gender affirming negotiating strategy to their repertoire: that of offering their earnings.  
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 Alternately, the association between failure and threats could mean that women choose 
threats when negotiating for interests that they think will encounter stiff opposition. Women 
tended to choose threats when negotiating for interests that could be interpreted as challenging 
masculine identity (interests with ambiguous gender meanings such as a wife’s desire for her 
husband to be faithful or sober).  This may have been because they expected, and in fact 
experienced, greater resistance when negotiating for those interests than when they negotiated 
for interests that merely challenged their own feminine identity (such as a wife’s or a daughter’s 
desire for greater freedom of movement or the right to work). Even though, according to 
Gutmann (1996), many working class Mexican men abstain from drinking or favor other means 
of satisfying sexual desire than extra-marital affairs, men may interpret a women’s direct plea for 
sobriety or fidelity as a challenge to their masculine identity and ‘do gender’ by refusing to 
comply.  Gutmann’s portrayal of men as agents of their own gender identity suggests that 
working class men may be willing to redefine practical realities of masculinity in modern 
Mexico but may still ‘do gender’ when key aspects of their masculinity are directly confronted. 
Gutmann acknowledges that working class Mexican men are ‘acutely aware of official images of 
the Mexican male drunk’ (p. 193) and admits that ‘stereotype of men in Mexico being subject to 
uncontrollable bodily urges and needs is widely held’ (p. 130). Future research could extend 
Gutmann’s research and examine how male interpretations of women’s interests as well as their 
negotiating strategies affect women’s household power.  
 More concretely, this study demonstrates that there are instances when women view 
offers of housework or financial contributions as a negotiating strategy rather than as the source 
of their oppression. When this is the case, we should reinterpret an increased burden of 
household labour as a calculated trade-off made in order to win practical changes. It is 
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undeniable that these and many other women working in the burgeoning export processing 
industry worldwide have what Molyneux (1985) would call a strategic interest in reducing their 
burden of housework and financial responsibility.  Nevertheless, identifying when this increased 
burden arises from a moment of agency is important because doing so reveals how women 
redefine gender norms through household negotiations (Agarwal, 1997). When women offer to 
take on responsibility in the household in order to win the right to work, they contribute to the 
process of redefining gender norms that restrict women’s access to resources, in this case 
earnings, which can improve their future bargaining leverage. According to Elson (1992), such 
bargains may eventually embolden women to redefine other gender norms; ones that pose, in 
Molyneux’s words (1985) strategic barriers to gender equity. Elson (1992) argues that women’s 
efforts to secure practical interests may be the building blocks of a women’s movement 
mobilized around women’s strategic interests.  She promotes movements that ‘help to transform 
gender relations by meeting both women’s practical needs and their strategic gender needs’ (p. 
42). To build such a movement, however, we need studies, such as this one, that first identify 
when and how women assert their practical interests. 
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Figure 1:  “Doing Gender” Household Bargaining Model 
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Table 1: Sample of Employed and Unemployed Stints Experienced by 18 Women 
 Daughters Married Total 
Employed Stints    
     Current 5 9 14 
     Past 14 6 20 
Unemployed Stints    
     Current  2 2 
     Past  9 9 
Total 19 26 45 
Based on 18 interviews. 
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Table 2: Employment as an Interest 
 Number Of Stints 
During Which 
Women 
Expressed An 
Interest To Work* 
Total Number 
Of Stints 
Stints During 
Which Women 
Expressed An 
Interest To 
Work As A 
Percent Of Total 
Stints 
Column Letter A B A/B 
Daughters 3 19 15 % 
Wives 11 26 42 % 
Total Number of Stints 14a 45 31 % 
Total Number of Women = 20    
* This only includes the stints during which other household members expressed opposition to 
women’s desire to work.  
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Table 3: Employment as a Bargained Outcome 
 Successful 
Bargains To 
Go To Work 
Total 
Number Of 
Employed 
Stints 
Bargained Employment 
Stints As % Of Total 
Employment Stints 
Column Letter A B A/Ba 
Daughters 3 19 16% 
Wives 7 15 46% 
Total Number of Stints 10 34 29% 
Total Number of Women = 20    
a. Column percents are not intended to add to 100%.  
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Table 4: Negotiating Strategies Women Used to Seek Employment 
Type Of Bargaining Strategies Daughters Wives Total 
Offers (Total) 4 7 11 
     Offer To Care For Herself 2 0 2 
     Offer Housework 1 2 3 
     Offer Financial Contribution 1 5 6 
Threats (Total) 0 2 2 
      Threaten To Leave Relationship  1 1 
      Threaten To Move  1 1 
Total Number Of Bargaining Strategies 4 9 13 
Total Number Of Women 3 8 11 
Note: One woman tried using two bargaining strategies in pro-longed negotiations with her 
partner to earn the right to work. One woman made two different bargains to seek employment at 
two different times. Therefore, there are 13 bargaining strategies used by 11 women.  
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Table 5: Power Outcomes By Bargaining Strategy Offers 
 Wins Losses Wins As A Percent Of Bargains By 
Bargaining Strategy 
Offers 13 0 100% 
     Daughters 5 0 100% 
     Wives 8 0 100% 
Withholding or 
Threatening to Withhold 
Services 
5 4 55% 
     Daughters 2 0 100% 
     Wives 3 4 42% 
Total 18 4 82% 
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Notes 
1 Note that optimistic portrayals of the effects of employment in export processing industries on 
women’s power at home focused on how employment influenced the respect accorded to women 
(Lim, 1983; Stoddard, 1987; Tiano, 1994).  
2 Two women used two different bargaining strategies in their attempts to win the right to work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
